The French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigilance: The Path of an Improbable Statute

Droit et Société - Épreuves

Europe

This article offers an analysis of the obstacles and resistance encountered by the defenders (NGOs and trade unions) of the French Law on Corporate Duty of Vigi- lance. It analyzes how these actors sought to behave as institutional entrepreneurs deploying intense advocacy and lobbying efforts in order to successfully have this bill tabled, examined and passed by the French government. In the light of this case, the concept of institutional entrepreneur is discussed and then relativized by the use of the notion of “Fortuna”, developed by Machiavelli, in order to describe the “im- probable” adoption of this statute. The results tend to put into perspective the importance that individual actors, including collective ones, can have in the explana- tion of institutional change, at the benefit of multi-level change analysis.

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Delalieux Guillaume